The choice of the PC of the B for initiating the fight in the field was in the contrahand of what adepts of the seted fight had also made the remain of the groupings, in the end of the decade of 60. The National Liberating Action (ALN), Revolutionary Movement 8 of Outubro (MR-8), Vanguarda Popular Revolucionria (VPR), Partido Revolutionary Brazilian Comunista (PCBR) and other organizations had begun for the urban actions: panfletagens, assaults the banks, robberies of armaments and the ammunition, murders of agents of the repression apparatus politics. But they considered preparatory urban guerrilla, since 8 would guarantee material resources, military experience and propaganda of its performance, to the fight in the field, seen as the truily decisive stage of the revolution. Throughout the decade of 60, the PC of the B was come close ideologically and politically to the Chinese communist regimen. Several of its pictures had passed for military and theoretical formation in that country, also guerrila that would come to be dislocated for the Araguaia. ' ' The PC of the B intended to implant an armed movement in Brazil inspired by the experience of China. It planned to open a revolutionary front in the interior of the country, to incorporate the masses of the agricultural area, to create a regular army, to involve the urban workers and to deflagrar a drawn out popular war.

(…) The party considered that it existed in Brazil objective conditions for a radical transformation by means of the fight armed. The contradictions in a half-industrialized country, the conflicts generated for the social inaqualities and the abuses of the dictatorship gave support to the use proposals of the violence against regime' '. (MORAL; SILVA.2005) It only remained to discover a more propitious land to plant the seed of the guerrilla. The form of mobilization of the population of to be chosen place had that to be debated.